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Abstract. The legality of safe injection facilities as a harm reduction method in response to 
the national opioid crisis continues to be a challenging and evolving issue involving federal, 
state, and local jurisprudence. As one indication of the predominance of local government in 
dealing with these issues, in February 2020 Philadelphia’s proposed safe injection facility 
(SIF) successfully fended off a challenge from the U.S. Department of Justice in federal 
district court,1 a decision now stayed pending appeal.2 While United States v. Safehouse is an 
important legal step for harm reduction advocates, it is not a guarantee of legality for SIFs. 
Commentators have paid close attention to the federal prosecution of SIFs, but federal law 
is just one impediment. Just as a federal prosecutor may seek to block a SIF, so may the 
state, the city council, or the police. A municipality seeking to open such a facility must 
coordinate among many stakeholders and then clear legal hurdles at each level of 
government before facing the U.S. Attorney. The legal pathway for SIFs was forged by 
other harm reduction policies that incubated at the local level. This Article addresses the 
legal status of safe injection facilities (SIFs) in the context of local harm reduction policies. 
Part I will provide a brief summary of the modern opioid crisis and government response. 
Part II will explore how harm reduction policy, especially for addressing drug use, is 
effectuated at the level of local government. Part III will discuss how SIFs fit into the same 
framework of harm reduction policies incubated locally. Finally, Part IV will review the state 
and federal legal challenges for SIFs and examine how those challenges fared in United States 
v. Safehouse. 
 
* University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, J.D. 2020. Many thanks to Adrienne Klusey and Jennifer 
Ahmann for their research assistance. I am also grateful for thoughtful input from Wendell Pritchett, Seth 
Kreimer, Richard Corbett, and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change. The 
views presented here are my own. 
 1   See United States v. Safehouse, No. 19-0519, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31620, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 
2020). 
 2   See United States v. Safehouse, No. 19-519, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110549, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 
2020). 
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE OPIOID CRISIS 
A. A brief history of the modern opioid crisis 
A problem as large as the opioid crisis can be described in many ways. Drug overdose is the 
leading cause of injury-related death in the United States.3 It is so prevalent that “[e]very day in 
America is like a 747 plane crash[]. . . .”4 In 2017 alone, more than 70,000 people in the United States 
died from overdose, a number exceeding all U.S. military casualties during the Vietnam War.5 
Philadelphia’s overdose death rate is four times its murder rate.6 Suffice it to say, the misuse of 
opioids—heroin, prescription pain medication, and synthetic opioids—is one of the deadliest public 
health crises in recent memory and likely the deadliest drug-related disaster in U.S. history.7 
An opioid drug, or “opioid,” is a drug that binds to opioid receptors in the brain with the 
effect of dulling the perception of pain.8 Pharmaceutical opioids are prescribed for pain management, 
but their use can also produce euphoric effects, which can lead to drug abuse.9 Scholars point to over-
prescription of opioid pain medication as the root of the opioid crisis in the United States.10 When 
 
 3   Ashley Duckworth, Fighting America’s Best-Selling Product: An Analysis of and Solution to the Opioid Crisis, 26 WASH. & 
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 237, 240 (2019) (citing Nat’1 Inst. on Drug Abuse, Overdose Death Rates, DRUGABUSE.GOV, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/V7UE-NVN9] (Jan. 
2019)); see also Opioid Overdose, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZQR3-G3BY] (last updated Sept. 3, 2020). 
 4   Taylor Cairns, Portland Social Worker Representing Maine at Opioid Epidemic Conference, WGME (July 9, 2019), 
https://wgme.com/news/local/portland-social-worker-representing-maine-at-opiod-epidemic-conference [https://perma.
cc/3DRZ-NLHT]. 
 5   Anthony Zurcher, Opioid Addiction and Death Mail-Ordered to Your Door, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43146286 [https://perma.cc/3S8J-FJL2] (“By [2017], more Americans had died 
from opioids than in the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.”); Amber A. Leary, A Safe Harbor in the Opioid Crisis: 
How the Federal Government Should Allow States to Legislate for Safe Injection Facilities in Light of the Opioid Public Health Emergency, 84 
BROOK. L. REV. 635, 641 (2019). 
 6   Aubrey Whelan, Safe Injection Sites to Fight Opioid Overdose Deaths Get Green Light from Philadelphia Officials, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.philly.com/philly/health/addiction/safe-injection-sites-overdose-deaths-opioids-
philadelphia-officials-support-20180123.html [https://perma.cc/9VS9-G538]. 
 7   See Leo Beletsky & Corey S. Davis, Today’s Fentanyl Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron Law, Revisited, 46 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 156, 
156 (2017). 
 8   Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse Blog Team, What Is an Opioid?, MICH. MED., https://medicine.umich.edu/dept/pain-
research/what-opioid [https://perma.cc/BD42-ET4C] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
 9   Id. 
 10   E.g., Corey S. Davis & Derek H. Carr, The Law and Policy of Opioids for Pain Management, Addiction Treatment, and 
Overdose Reversal, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 9 (2017) (“Opioid prescriptions nearly quadrupled from 1999 to 2010, 
accompanied by a nearly identical rise in the rate of prescription opioid-related deaths. . . . [I]t is clear that this increase in 
opioid prescriptions and related addiction has also helped fuel the recent increase in heroin overdose in the United States, 
which more than tripled between 2010 and 2013.”). For brief histories of the emergence of the opioid epidemic, see Nabarun 
Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 182–83 (2018); 
Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 464–77 
(2017). 
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prescription drugs run out or become prohibitively expensive, users turn instead to heroin or 
fentanyl, a highly potent synthetic opioid. Pharmaceutical companies have received criticism for 
zealous marketing of opioid pain medication11 and are increasingly facing liability for their role in the 
opioid crisis.12 Beyond corporate irresponsibility, scholars also blame the government’s punitive “War 
on Drugs” approach to opioid use, as opposed to an addiction treatment-based approach, for 
exacerbating the problem.13 
The trend of opioid consumption is generally on the rise. Opioid prescriptions nearly 
quadrupled from 1999 to 2010, accompanied by a nearly identical rise in the rate of prescription 
opioid-related deaths;14 a more recent study identifies synthetic opioids and spikes in eastern states 
and the District of Columbia as increasingly deadly.15 Nationwide, overdose deaths decreased four 
percent between 2017 and 201816 but increased again in 2019, with even more deaths anticipated in 
2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.17 
 
 11   See Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 
36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 562 (2015) (documenting efforts by Purdue Pharma, makers of Oxycontin, to encourage 
prescribing of opioids for pain); Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 
99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 221–23 (2009) (describing the aggressive promotion of Oxycontin for the “non-malignant” pain 
market and subsequent increase in prescriptions). 
 12   The most prominent case against opioid manufacturers, pharmacies, and medical providers is In re National 
Prescription Opiate Litigation, No. 1:17-cv-02804, 2018 WL 4895856, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2018), an ongoing multidistrict 
litigation encompassing product liability, negligence, and public nuisance claims from more than 2,500 cities, counties, tribal 
authorities, and individuals. In 2019, the state of Oklahoma won a $572 million verdict against Johnson & Johnson in 
Oklahoma state court, as well as settlements from co-defendants Purdue Pharmaceuticals ($270 million) and Teva 
Pharmaceuticals ($85 million). State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 Okla. Dist. LEXIS 3486, at 
*1 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Aug. 26, 2019); Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark Opioid Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/oklahoma-opioids-johnon-and-johnson.html 
[https://perma.cc/3HW2-6W68]. This verdict is the first ruling to hold a pharmaceutical company responsible for the opioid 
epidemic, following years of myriad lawsuits and settlements. See James G. Hodge Jr. et al., Emerging Legal Responses to Curb the 
Opioid Epidemic, 45 J. MED. & ETHICS 460, 461 (2017) (describing a 2017 Cherokee Nation suit under “public nuisance” theory 
and a 2017 suit by the state of South Carolina against pharmaceutical manufacturer Purdue); Davis & Carr, supra note 10, at 10 
(describing, inter alia, a 2006 federal case against Purdue Pharmaceuticals, a 2015 case prosecuted by the Kentucky Attorney 
General against the makers of OxyContin, and a 2015 case prosecuted by the Oregon Attorney General against pharmaceutical 
manufacturer Insys). 
 13   See Scott Burris et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic: Legal Issues in the Provision of Naloxone to Prevent Opioid Overdose, 1 
DREXEL L. REV. 273, 277–78 (2009) [hereinafter Burris et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic] (describing how the War on Drugs 
has made it more difficult to prevent overdoses as “[i]llicit drugs fluctuate in potency; illicit drug users are often afraid to call 
911 when they observe overdoses; and drug users who have been incarcerated face an elevated risk of overdose at 
release. . . .”). 
 14   Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vital Signs: Overdoses of Prescription Opioid Pain 
Relievers—United States, 1999–2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Nov. 4, 2011, at 1487, 1489–91. 
 15   Matthew V. Kiang et al., Assessment of Changes in the Geographical Distribution of Opioid-Related Mortality Across the United 
States by Opioid Type, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Feb. 2019, at 1, 4–6. 
 16   Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/
epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/FK3U-JVV8] (last updated Mar. 19, 2020). 
 17   Carla K. Johnson, New Peak of 71K US Overdose Deaths in 2019 Dashes Hopes, AP NEWS (Jul. 15, 2020), https://
apnews.com/dc15cae6e299bbbf73ce0e4b67d4d02d [https://perma.cc/Q646-QWED]; see also Nora D. Volkow, Collisions of the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol24/iss1/3
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Public health experts have stated for years that death from opioid overdose is easily and 
affordably prevented.18 When a person overdoses using opioids, their breathing slows gradually, 
which creates a window of time to administer overdose reversal medication.19 This medication, 
naloxone, is an opioid antagonist, meaning that it binds to opioid receptors without activating them, 
thereby displacing the opioids bound there.20 Naloxone is administered as a nasal spray (Narcan) or as 
an injection.21 Someone given naloxone should be monitored for several hours,22 but in many cases 
aftercare does not require a hospital visit.23 The relatively low cost and the minimal complexity of 
naloxone as a medical intervention is in stark comparison to alcohol overdose response, which can 
require induced vomiting, oxygen therapy, and intravenous fluids. 
B. Recent government responses to the opioid crisis 
In 2016, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act 
of 2016 (CARA), the largest piece of drug legislation since the Controlled Substances Act.24 CARA 
expanded naloxone access, supplied addiction treatment for prisoners and pregnant women, and 
created task forces on drug trafficking and prescribing practices.25 A few months later, the federal 
 
COVID-19 and Addiction Epidemics, 173 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 61 (2020) (describing increased COVID-19 challenges and 
risks for opioid users). The most recent CDC data indicate increased overdose deaths in most states during 2019, driven largely 
by synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. VSRR Provisional Drug Overdose Death Counts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://data.cdc.gov/NCHS/VSRR-Provisional-Drug-Overdose-Death-Counts/xkb8-kh2a [https://perma.cc/
59X2-365Y] (last updated Sept. 16, 2020); One study suggests that the opioid overdose death toll is even greater than 
previously estimated due to unspecified overdose records. Andrew J. Boslett et al., Using Contributing Causes of Death Improves 
Prediction of Opioid Involvement in Unclassified Drug Overdoses in US Death Records, 115 ADDICTION 1308, 1308 (2020). 
 18   See Burris et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic, supra note 13, at 276–77 (“The heart of the challenge is the possibility 
that things could be different: overdose is a public health problem that can be solved. Unlike many of the other leading causes 
of death, death from opioid overdose is almost entirely preventable, and preventable at a low cost. Opioids kill by depressing 
respiration, a slow mode of death that leaves plenty of time for effective medical intervention. Overdose is rapidly reversed by 
the administration of a safe and inexpensive drug called naloxone. Naloxone strips clean the brain’s opioid receptors and 
reverses the respiratory depression causing almost immediate withdrawal.”); Karl A. Sporer, Strategies for Preventing Heroin 
Overdose, 326 BMJ 442, 443 (2003) (describing naloxone as an “inexpensive” intervention). 
 19   Burris et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic, supra note 13, at 277. 
 20   ERIN BAGALMAN & ADA S. CORNELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10741, NALOXONE FOR OPIOID OVERDOSE: 
REGULATION AND POLICY OPTIONS 1 (2017). 
 21   Id. 
 22   Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Naloxone, DRUGABUSE.GOV 3 (Sept. 2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/
files/drugfacts-naloxone.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7Q2-GMDC]. 
 23   See Michael W. Willman et al., Do Heroin Overdose Patients Require Observation After Receiving Naloxone?, 55 CLINICAL 
TOXICOLOGY 81, 82–84 (2017) (reviewing literature to conclude some patients treated with naloxone can be released safely 
without transport to hospitals if vitals and other factors are normal). 
 24   Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695 (2016); Leary, supra note 
5, at 650. 
 25   Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act § 101 (requiring HHS to convene a Pain Management Best Practices 
Inter-Agency Task Force); § 103 (creating grants to expand access to FDA-approved drugs for emergency overdose treatment); 
§ 201 (creating grants for alternative to incarceration programs and prison-based family treatment programs for pregnant 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
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government provided $1 billion in grants to states over two years for opioid prevention in the 21st 
Century Cures Act.26 Most federal drug spending, however, continues to go toward drug control and 
law enforcement.27 For its part, the Trump administration has emphasized law enforcement and 
funding the development of non-narcotic pain management in its response to the opioid crisis.28 
Federal prosecution of opioid-related crimes focuses on distributors of heroin and fentanyl, including 
traffickers and “pill-mill” operations;29 prosecution for simple possession is generally not a priority.30 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), as the primary administrator of the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA),31 adopts and enforces regulations for prescription opioid manufacturers and 
distributors.32 
On the state level, governments have responded in myriad ways.33 To address pill-mills and 
the over-prescription of opioids, states have implemented prescription drug monitoring programs at 
their health administrative agencies.34 Some states have opted to cover medication-assisted treatment 
 
women); § 501 (allocating funding for outpatient treatment of pregnant and postpartum women in residential treatment 
programs). 
 26   21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No, 114-255, § 1003, 130 Stat. 1033, 1045 (2015). 
 27   LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43749, DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2014). 
 28   EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, AN UPDATE ON THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG 
ADDICTION AND THE OPIOID CRISIS: ONE YEAR LATER 9–12, 18–19 (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/Opioid-Commission-Report-One-Year-Later-20190507.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3BH-YSBT]. 
 29   For example, in April 2019 federal prosecutors announced its largest opioid trafficking enforcement operation to 
date: the indictment of sixty individuals—primarily medical professionals—selling pain pill prescriptions. Off. of Pub. Aff., 
U.S. Dep’t. of Just., Press Release, Second Appalachian Region Prescription Opioid Strikeforce Takedown Results in Charges Against 13 
Individuals, Including 11 Physicians (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/second-appalachian-region-prescription-
opioid-strikeforce-takedown-results-charges-against-13 [https://perma.cc/D3ZB-NZWJ]; see also Campbell Robertson, Doctors 
Accused of Trading Opioid Prescriptions for Sex and Cash, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/17/us/doctor-arrested-prescription-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/MT6M-7E6M]. 
 30   United States v. Safehouse, No. 19-519, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110549, at *19–20 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2020) 
(“Widespread prosecution of simple possession has only occurred in tandem with other law enforcement initiatives, such as 
border control strategies. In 2019, nationwide, there were only 560 federal cases brought for simple possession, and 243 of 
those emanated from just two districts, one in a border state . . . .When the federal government does choose to prosecute it, 
simple possession is a misdemeanor for a first-time offender, and, except for offenses involving unlawful entry, it results in 
probation or a fine more than seventy percent of the time.”) (citation omitted); Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate Stith, The Opioid 
Crisis and Federal Criminal Prosecution, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 292, 296–97 (2018) (“Traditionally, the U.S. Attorney’s Offices – 
along with the federal government itself – have not dedicated their limited resources to prosecuting simple possession of 
heroin . . . [and] have not sought to prosecute drug-dependent users who simply sell some of the substance to support their 
habit. Rather, U.S. Attorney’s Offices have typically focused on the seizure of drug transshipments and prosecution of major 
distributors . . . .”). 
 31   U.S. Dep’t of Just., Practitioner’s Manual: An Informational Outline of the Controlled Substances Act 4 (2006), 
http://www.legalsideofpain.com/uploads/pract_manual090506.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XTF-Q9MN]. 
 32   For an overview of the federal government’s measures to punish opioid-related crimes, see Edgar Aliferov, The Role 
of Direct-Injury Government-Entity Lawsuits in the Opioid Litigation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1141, 1151–52 (2018). 
 33   See generally Andrew M. Parker et al., State Responses to the Opioid Crisis, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 367 (2018). 
 34   See, e.g., New Jersey Prescription Monitoring Program, N.J. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, https://www.state.nj.us/health/
populationhealth/opioid/opioid_pmp.shtml [https://perma.cc/44TZ-HCN3] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); Maryland Prescription 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol24/iss1/3
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for opioid addiction under their state Medicaid plans.35 States have also increased access to naloxone 
and implemented clean needle and syringe exchange programs.36 To encourage use of emergency 
services during an overdose, state-level “Good Samaritan” laws immunize people from prosecution 
for drug possession when they call for help.37 
Scholars and public health professionals have called for these and other harm reduction 
approaches to the opioid epidemic. Harm reduction is a catch-all term for interventions that aim to 
improve health outcomes by minimizing risks and lessening adverse effects of drug use.38 Harm 
reduction began in the 1980s as a grassroots effort to limit the spread of HIV and hepatitis B.39 
Implicit in a harm reduction approach to drug use is not criminalizing “low-level” drug users who are 
dealing with substance use disorder.40 Instead, addiction is treated as a disease and a public health 
concern, such that health and safety outcomes are prioritized over criminal prosecution. 
The call for harm reduction approaches to the opioid epidemic is undoubtedly entangled 
with the framing of opioid use as a “white” problem. Whites are more likely to be prescribed opioids 
than non-white racial groups.41 Once opioid addiction and opioid-related overdose began to ravage 
white communities and effect a measurable decrease on white life expectancy, policymakers 
 
Drug Monitoring Program, MD. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, https://bha.health.maryland.gov/pdmp/Pages/Home.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/BKF7-LD3Z] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); see generally State Successes, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/policy/successes.html [https://perma.cc/CS9D-E39H] (last updated July 
29, 2019). 
 35   Parker et al., supra note 33, at 371. 
 36   See infra Parts II.A-B. 
 37   See Medications to Treat Opioid Use Disorder Research Report, NAT’L. INST. ON DRUG ABUSE 24 (June 2018), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/download/21349/medications-to-treat-opioid-use-disorder-research-report.pdf?v=99088f7
584dac93ddcfa98648065bfbe [https://perma.cc/ZEU7-H8SK]. 
 38   See generally Diane E. Logan & G. Alan Marlatt, Harm Reduction Therapy: A Practice-Friendly Review of Research, 66 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCH. 201 (2010) (explaining how harm reduction interventions are used in a variety of clinical settings). 
 39   Gerry V. Stimson & Pat O’Hare, Harm Reduction: Moving Through the Third Decade, 21 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 91, 91 
(2010). 
 40   See Harm Reduction, DRUG POL’Y ALL., https://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/harm-reduction [https://perma.cc/
2EXL-FGBZ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (“Harm reduction stands in stark contrast to a punitive approach to problematic 
drug use—it is based on acknowledging the dignity and humanity of people who use drugs and bringing them into a 
community of care in order to minimize negative consequences and promote optimal health and social inclusion.”). 
 41   Helena Hansen & Julie Netherland, Is the Prescription Opioid Epidemic a White Problem?, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2127, 
2128 (2016). Whites’ greater access to prescription opioids is at least partially explained by better access to insurance coverage 
and medical care. Id. Non-white patients with similar access to medical care as white patients tend to be less likely to be 
prescribed opioids. Id. Racial disparities in pain management have been attributed to prescribers’ racial bias and to more 
aggressive marketing of prescription opioids in white rural areas. See Keturah James & Ayana Jordan, The Opioid Crisis in Black 
Communities, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 404, 408 (2018); Austin Frakt & Toni Monkovic, A ‘Rare Case Where Racial Biases’ Protected 
African-Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/upshot/opioid-epidemic-blacks.html 
[https://perma.cc/VY8N-KFUH]. The racial gap in opioid-related deaths shows signs of narrowing in the last two years. 
Agency for Healthcare Res. & Quality, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Blacks Experiencing Fast-Rising Rates of Overdose Deaths 
Involving Synthetic Opioids Other than Methadone (Feb. 2020), https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/research/
findings/nhqrdr/dataspotlight-opioid.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4HJ-LA3P]. 
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responded with nonpunitive measures.42 The War on Drugs, by contrast, criminalized drug addiction 
and penalized Black drug users much more than white drug users, while drug policy proposals for 
disproportionately white opioid users typically take a more humane, public health based approach.43 
II. HARM REDUCTION BEGINS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
Local governments are especially and uniquely equipped to accomplish harm reduction. 
Local governments are on the frontlines of the opioid crisis and its effects.44 Municipal police and 
emergency services respond to overdoses. In cities, behavioral health departments provide addiction 
recovery services and helplines. Local parks—even Little League baseball parks—have become sites 
for intravenous drug users to inject, and for municipal recreation departments to clean up.45 
The opioid crisis, while often associated with rural communities,46 has had a major impact 
on urban centers, where residents are concentrated and where opioids are trafficked along major 
highway routes to buyers in cities. Trafficking patterns channel opioids to cities in the Northeast, 
creating a distribution highway.47 Cities, as concentrated governing bodies dealing with residents in 
crisis, are quicker on the uptake with harm reduction initiatives than states. At the local level, city 
governments can collect input from harm reduction advocates and test out nonpunitive harm 
reduction strategies. Harm reduction, especially when taken up in lieu of criminalization, requires 
coordination among police, emergency responders, prosecutors, and public health departments. Such 
multifaceted coordination is piloted most seamlessly within a locality. Cities also have the legal might 
 
 42   Hansen & Netherland, supra note 41. 
 43   See generally James & Jordan, supra note 41 (explaining how the framing of the opioid epidemic as an issue mainly 
facing white communities ignores the impact of the epidemic on Black communities and perpetuates the disparate treatment 
they receive). For an overview of the anti-Black motivation for, and racially disparate impact of, the War on Drugs, see 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 97–101 (2010). 
 44   See Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection 
Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1107–08 n.96 (2009) [hereinafter Burris et al., Federalism] (citing Richard Briffault, Home Rule 
for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 256–57 (2004)) (discussing how city and county governments bear the brunt of 
the burden of service delivery and emergency response to drug abuse and may be best able to judge the necessity and 
effectiveness of locally implemented interventions). 
 45   See, e.g., Kate Zernike, To Fight Crime, a Poor City Will Trade In Its Police, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/nyregion/overrun-by-crime-camden-trades-in-its-police-force.html [https://perma.
cc/9393-S4Y9] (covering heroin use in public parks in Camden, New Jersey). 
 46   See, e.g., Katherine M. Keyes et al., Understanding the Rural–Urban Differences in Nonmedical Prescription Opioid Use and 
Abuse in the United States, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e52, e52 (2014) (“[D]eath and injury from nonmedical prescription opioid 
misuse are concentrated in states with large rural populations, such as Kentucky, West Virginia, Alaska, and Oklahoma. . . . 
[I]ndividuals in counties outside metropolitan areas have higher rates of drug poisoning deaths, including deaths from opioids, 
and opioid poisonings in nonmetropolitan counties have increased at a rate greater than threefold the increase in metropolitan 
countries.”). While “rural” describes geographic concentration, it is also racially tinged, drawing a distinction between 
rural/white and urban/Black. Christine Minhee & Steve Calandrillo, The Cure for America’s Opioid Crisis? End the War on Drugs, 42 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 542, 568–70, 575, 577 (2019). 
 47   See Rebecca D. O’Brien and Thomas Mashberg of The Record, Woodland Park, NJ, THE PULITZER PRIZES, https://www.
pulitzer.org/finalists/rebecca-d-obrien-and-thomas-mashberg [https://perma.cc/C9WR-HCEA] (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) 
(aggregating a full series of investigative pieces from The Record on the New Jersey heroin trade). 
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to face off challenges from state and federal governments. 
Once a harm reduction policy is workshopped in localities, it can be adopted as statewide 
policy. As the controversy surrounding a policy diminishes over time, its effectiveness can be 
measured. For instance, localities led the charge on such initiatives as public smoking bans, 
environmental protection, and civil rights.48 Such initiatives were not without controversy and legal 
opposition.49 This cities-as-laboratories policy device is particularly important for developing harm 
reduction solutions to the opioid crisis that present viable alternatives to the federal government’s 
more punitive approach to drug use. Syringe exchanges and naloxone availability provide two such 
illustrations. 
A. Syringe exchange programs 
Syringe exchange programs (SEPs), also known as needle exchanges, are emblematic of a 
harm reduction strategy effectuated at the local level to the chagrin of state and federal officials. SEPs 
provide clean needles and syringes for intravenous drug users to reduce the risk of infection and 
disease transmission.50 Private charitable organizations opened the first U.S. SEP in 1988 in Tacoma, 
Washington as a harm reduction response to the HIV epidemic.51 SEPs were legally risky because 
they involved the distribution of drug paraphernalia. Throughout the mid-twentieth century, states 
enacted “head shop” laws based on the DEA’s Model Drug Paraphernalia Act.52 Under these laws, 
which were designed to prosecute sellers of rolling papers and freebasing kits, anyone supplying or 
owning injection equipment could be criminally prosecuted.53 Gradually, more and more cities 
opened SEPs. By 1995, there were at least 60 SEPs across 21 states, many of them in violation of 
their states’ head shop laws and lacking other legal authorization.54 
The experience of SEPs in New Jersey illustrates the evolution of harm reduction from 
private, criminalized activity to local policy, and then to eventual state authorization. New Jersey had 
a head shop law closely matching the DEA model law but with an additional section to prohibit non-
physician, illegitimate distribution of syringes and needles.55 In the 1990s, the State of New Jersey 
 
 48   Burris et al., Federalism, supra note 44, at 1108–09. 
 49   See, e.g., M.L. Nixon et al., Tobacco Industry Litigation to Deter Local Public Health Ordinances: The Industry Usually Loses in 
Court, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 65, 66–68 (2004) (discussing industry challenges to local smoking bans where challenges were 
based on state preemption grounds). 
 50   Syringe Services Programs (SSPs) Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 1 (July 19, 2019), https://
www.cdc.gov/ssp/docs/SSP-FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDW9-E64W]. SEPs are demonstrably effective at reducing 
disease spread and connecting drug users into addiction treatment. Id. 
 51   Scott Burris et al., Lethal Injections: The Law, Science, and Politics of Syringe Access for Injection Drug Users, 37 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 813, 817 (2003). 
 52   Id. at 816–17; see generally 21 U.S.C. § 863. 
 53   Id. 
 54   Id. at 817–18 (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Syringe Exchange Programs—United States, 1994–1995, 44 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Sept. 22, 1995, at 684 (1995)). 
 55   State ex rel. Atl. Cty. Prosecutor v. City of Atl. City, 879 A.2d 1206, 1208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (citing 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:36-6). Under this statute, privately run SEPs in New Jersey faced criminal sanctions. State v. McCague, 
714 A.2d 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); cf. Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993) (upholding criminal 
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pursued successful criminal convictions under the head shop law against community organizers 
distributing syringes and needles in several cities in the state.56 In 2004, the local government of 
Atlantic City established a SEP by city ordinance to reduce the spread of HIV and Hepatitis C.57 
Atlantic City’s SEP ordinance was defeated in state court,58 but the New Jersey legislature gave SEPs 
the green light just two years later.59 
Likewise, in New York, a privately-run SEP faced criminal charges but evaded them, having 
successfully argued a necessity defense.60 One year later, the state’s health department adopted 
regulations authorizing a needle exchange program.61 In Illinois, SEPs operated under a creative 
“research” exemption to the state head shop law62 until they became specifically authorized under 
state statute in 2019.63 Prevention Point, an SEP in Philadelphia, began as an underground effort in 
1991 before operating in the open under a 1992 mayoral executive order.64 Efforts to legalize SEPs in 
Pennsylvania are ongoing.65 
Where state governments are willing to authorize SEPs, local government cooperation is still 
paramount and functionally dispositive of whether the SEP will be successfully implemented. In Scott 
County, Indiana, a large outbreak of HIV among intravenous drug users in 2015 prompted the state 
to authorize SEPs under limited circumstances.66 Localities, however, were not always on cooperative. 
County councils defunded and shut down state-authorized SEPs, citing concerns about abetting drug 
use.67 Police officers voiced their opposition to syringe distribution efforts because they undermined 
 
charges for private needle exchange under state law that prohibited the distribution of hypodermic needles without a 
prescription). 
 56   State v. Sorge, 591 A.2d 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991); McCague, 714 A.2d at 937. 
 57   State ex rel. Atl. Cty. Prosecutor, 879 A.2d at 1207. 
 58   Id. 
 59   Bloodborne Disease Harm Reduction Act, ch. 99, 2006 N.J. Laws 928 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:5C-25 to 
-31 (West 2016)). For a review of the effectiveness of SEPs in New Jersey, see MARY E. O’DOWD, N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
NEW JERSEY SYRINGE ACCESS PROGRAM DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: FINAL REPORT 7–10 (2012), https://www.drugpolicy.
org/sites/default/files/nj-doh-sap-final-report-2012_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XNY6-2GFD]. 
 60   People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.Y.S.2d 507 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
 61   N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 80.135 (2020); People v. Monroe, 593 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743–44 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 1992). 
 62   720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/1(a) (West 2019); People v. Presa, 24 N.E.3d 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
 63   Act of Aug. 9, 2019, S.B. 1828, § 200, 2019 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West) (amending 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/1 
(West 2019)). 
 64   History of PPP, PREVENTION POINT, https://ppponline.org/about-us/history-ppp [https://perma.cc/7283-SJWU] 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2020). 
 65   Aneri Pattani, Syringe Exchanges Deemed ‘Life-Sustaining’ During Pa. Coronavirus Shutdown, Raising Hopes for Eventual 
Legislation, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/health/2020/03/30/syringe-
exchanges-pa-prevention-point-pittsburgh-needles-covid-19-addiction-services/stories/202003300062 
[https://perma.cc/NDN8-C6U3]. 
 66   Nicholas Golding, The Needle and the Damage Done: Indiana’s Response to the 2015 HIV Epidemic and the Need to Change 
State and Federal Policies Regarding Needle Exchanges and Intravenous Drug Users, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 173, 189–90 (2017). 
 67   Giles Bruce, Conservative Indiana Adopted Needle Exchanges but Still Faces Local Resistance, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 
12, 2020), https://khn.org/news/conservative-indiana-adopted-needle-exchanges-but-still-faces-local-resistance 
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the policing responsibility to enforce laws prohibiting possession and intent to inject controlled 
substances.68 West Virginia has had similar decreases in SEP availability due to local backlash.69 Local 
police can also undermine SEP efforts by targeting people who lawfully use SEP services. In 
Bridgeport, Connecticut, the local police repeatedly harassed and arrested drug users for lawfully 
possessing injection equipment they had received from their SEP and stopped only when a class of 
users secured a permanent injunction in federal court.70 
Privately funded SEPs are unlikely to last without tacit cooperation from their respective 
local government, which can otherwise mount a legal challenge. Some states that authorize SEPs 
condition that authorization on local approval.71 But even when such approval is not statutorily 
required, a local government can still bar implementation of a private SEP by withholding approval 
on various pretexts. For example, in Belleville, Illinois, the city government successfully challenged a 
proposed SEP at an HIV care facility for improper zoning.72 The facility was in a “light industrial” 
zone, but the city denied approval on the basis that the SEP failed to allege sufficiently specific facts 
about how it “packed the pharmaceuticals,” i.e. the syringes, “in some way” that would allow it to 
claim a permitted “packing” use in the district.73 While some localities, like the counties in Indiana, 
make their opposition to SEPs known by withholding public health money, the Belleville case 
illustrates the subtler legal lengths to which a locality can stretch to block even a private SEP. 
B. Naloxone availability and overdose response training 
Local governments have also led the charge in equipping residents with naloxone and 
training them to identify and treat overdoses.74 The importance of municipalities’ roles in advancing 
naloxone availability is less obvious than for SEPs because it is generally less controversial, facing 
negligible opposition from state governments. Every state has taken steps to expand naloxone 
access.75 In most states, this is accomplished by a standing order to give a prescription for naloxone 
 
[https://perma.cc/2LV6-XXUK]. 
 68   Id.; Jordan Morey, County Health Department, Local Law Enforcement Debate Harm Reduction Service, THE TRIBUNE (Dec. 
20, 2019, 11:46 AM), http://www.tribtown.com/2019/12/20/county_health_department_local_law_
enforcement_debate_harm_reduction_service/ [https://perma.cc/Z26Z-5RTA]. 
 69   Bruce, supra note 67. 
 70   Doe v. Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 198 F.R.D. 325, 330, 350 (D. Conn. 2001); see also L.B. v. Town of Chester, 232 F. 
Supp. 2d 227, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing the arrest of a lawful possessor of hypodermic needles without probable cause). 
 71   Melissa Vallejo, Note, Safer Bathrooms in Syringe Exchange Programs: Injecting Progress into the Harm Reduction Movement, 
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1185, 1198–99 (2018). 
 72   City of Belleville v. Bethany Place, No. 5-13-0363, 2014 WL 4415237 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 8, 2014). For a discussion 
on the racist and segregationist history of modern zoning ordinances, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 39–57 
(2017). 
 73   Bethany Place, 2014 WL 4415237, at *2–3. 
 74   For an overview of naloxone distribution to laypersons, see Eliza Wheeler et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, Opioid Overdose Prevention Programs Providing Naloxone to Laypersons—United States, 2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP., June 19, 2015, at 631. 
 75   AM. MED. ASS’N, NATIONAL ROADMAP ON STATE-LEVEL EFFORTS TO END THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: LEADING-
EDGE PRACTICES AND NEXT STEPS 21 (2019), https://end-overdose-epidemic.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/AMA-
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to everyone in the jurisdiction.76 States can also authorize pharmacists to prescribe naloxone directly, 
such that a naloxone purchase resembles an over-the-counter purchase.77 Even the federal 
government, which is typically bellicose on issues of harm reduction, has been unopposed to the 
states’ sanction of naloxone.78 
When it comes to actualizing naloxone availability, however, standing orders fall short. In 
practice, access to naloxone varies. Individual purchasers are a small proportion of naloxone sales,79 
which suggests that standing orders and pharmacist authorizations account little for increasing 
naloxone access. Moreover, audit studies reveal that a minority of pharmacies actually stock naloxone 
and provide accurate information about its availability.80 
As a result, the work of getting naloxone in the hands of people who need it falls on harm 
reduction advocates and local governments. There is strong evidence that local opioid education and 
naloxone distribution programs are working to reduce overdose deaths.81 Equipping police officers 
 
Manatt-National-Roadmap-September-2019-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SCG-8ZGJ]. 
 76   See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MEDICATIONS TO TREAT OPIOID USE DISORDER RESEARCH REPORT 24 
(2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/medications-to-treat-opioid-addiction/naloxone-accessible 
[https://perma.cc/6SGN-ARZB]; Janet Weiner et al., Expanding Access to Naloxone: A Review of Distribution Strategies, PENN 
LEONARD DAVIS INST. OF HEALTH ECON. 3 (May 29, 2019), https://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/expanding-access-naloxone-review-
distribution-strategies [https://perma.cc/MY5P-TM9V] (“Most states have passed laws that allow pharmacists to dispense 
naloxone under a standing order, which does not require a physician’s prescription.”). A city health commissioner or other 
licensed public health official may also give such a standing order, but that power comes from the state’s authorization of 
licensed providers to prescribe naloxone by standing order. See Weiner et al., supra note 76 (“At least 23 states have issued 
statewide standing orders by a physician-official, while 24 others allow jurisdictions to pass standing order laws.”); see, e.g., MD. 
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 13-3103(c) (West 2017) (allowing individuals without training and education in opioid overdose 
response to obtain naloxone); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 13-3106(b)(1) (West 2017) (allowing a licensed health care 
provider employed by the state or local health departments to prescribe and dispense naloxone by issuing a standing order); 
Press Release, Baltimore City Health Dep’t, Baltimore City Health Commissioner Signs New Standing Order for Opioid 
Overdose Reversal Medication (June 1, 2017), https://health.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2017-06-01-baltimore-
city-health-commissioner-signs-new-standing-order-opioid [https://perma.cc/Z7UC-MXLD]. 
 77   See Weiner et al., supra note 76 (“Nine states give pharmacists direct authority to prescribe and sell naloxone to the 
public.”). 
 78   See, e.g., 21st Century Cures Act, supra note 26. The Trump administration has shown support for naloxone 
availability. In April 2018, the Surgeon General issued an “advisory” encouraging individuals to obtain and carry naloxone. 
EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 28, at 17. 
 79   See Weiner et al., supra note 76, at 1 (“About 83% of naloxone units were sold to non-retail settings of care, such as 
hospitals and clinics, health departments, and institutions that supply first responders, emergency medical services, and 
community groups. Seventeen percent of sales were to retail and mail-order/specialty pharmacies. . . . The retail setting 
accounted for a small but growing proportion of total naloxone dispensing.”). 
 80   Id. 
 81   See, e.g., Alexander Y. Walley et al., Opioid Overdose Rates and Implementation of Overdose Education and Nasal Naloxone 
Distribution in Massachusetts: Interrupted Time Series Analysis, BMJ, Feb. 9, 2013, at 1 (presenting a comparative study of nineteen 
Massachusetts localities with overdose education and naloxone distribution programs which showed a reduction in opioid 
overdose death); Eliza Wheeler et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Community-Based Opioid Overdose Prevention Programs 
Providing Naloxone—United States 2010, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Feb. 17, 2012, at 101, 103 (finding that 
community-based programs have resulted in over ten thousand overdose reversals); see also Margaret Lowenstein et al., Overdose 
Awareness and Reversal Trainings at Philadelphia Public Libraries, AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION, July 14, 2020, at 1 (finding improved 
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with naloxone, another local government policy decision, is a potentially important means of 
naloxone dispersal.82 Most police officers do not carry naloxone—it is up to localities and police 
departments to budget for it.83 Even in major cities like Chicago and Seattle, whether or not officers 
carry naloxone is based on where they patrol, leaving many without it.84 Like for SEPs, the role of 
localities is essential to the effectiveness of naloxone distribution as a harm reduction policy. 
III. SAFE INJECTION FACILITIES AS LOCAL HARM REDUCTION 
Like other harm reduction policy proposals to address the opioid crisis, SIFs are incubating 
at the local level of government. An SIF or, more euphemistically, an overdose prevention site or 
community health engagement location (CHEL), is a place where intravenous drug users can 
consume drugs under medical supervision.85 Medical personnel can intervene with overdose-reversal 
medication like naloxone and provide information about treatment for opioid addiction and general 
social services. Sites in Canada, Australia, and Europe have reported notable successes with reducing 
opioid overdose deaths and connecting users with treatment.86 SIFs have even received the attention 
and endorsement of the American Medical Association.87 
Although no SIF operates in any official capacity in the United States,88 plans are underway. 
Seattle has allocated funding and established a working group to locate a site.89 Burlington,90 
 
opioid response readiness from post-training surveys at local overdose trainings). 
 82   See Corey S. Davis et al., Expanded Access to Naloxone Among Firefighters, Police Officers, and Emergency Medical Technicians 
in Massachusetts, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e7 (2014) (describing how police officers are often the first ones to reach the scene of 
an overdose, and often more prevalent throughout cities, enabling them to administer naloxone more quickly than other first 
responders). 
 83   Mattie Quinn, Most Police Still Don’t Carry the Drug That Reverses an Opioid Overdose, GOVERNING (May 2019), https://
www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-naloxone-police-officers-cities.html [https://perma.cc/M2TN-FASG]. 
 84   Id. 
 85   Alex Kreit, Safe Injection Sites and the Federal “Crack House” Statute, 60 B.C. L. REV. 413, 416 (2019). 
 86   European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Drug Consumption Rooms: An Overview of Provision and 
Evidence 5–6 (2018), https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2734/POD_Drug%20consumption%20
rooms.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX27-LA4P]; S.F. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, HARM REDUCTION SERVICES IN SAN FRANCISCO 
ISSUE BRIEF 15–20 (June 2017), https://www.sfdph.org/dph/files/SIStaskforce/IssueBrief-06202017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RYE7-54DF]. 
 87   Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Wants New Approaches to Combat Synthetic and Injectable Drugs (June 12, 
2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-wants-new-approaches-combat-synthetic-and-injectable-
drugs [https://perma.cc/G6XW-XP9J]. 
 88   There are reports of one secret, unsanctioned site operating in an undisclosed location in the United States. Alex H. 
Kral & Peter J. Davidson, Addressing the Nation’s Opioid Epidemic: Lessons from an Unsanctioned Supervised Injection Site in the U.S., 53 
AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 919 (2017). Some existing SEPs are starting to resemble SIFs in that they provide safety measures in 
their bathrooms for drug users, such as an intercom system to check for users’ consciousness every three minutes. See Vallejo, 
supra note 71, at 1202–04. 
 89   N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, OVERDOSE PREVENTION IN NEW YORK CITY: SUPERVISED 
INJECTION AS A STRATEGY TO REDUCE OPIOID OVERDOSE AND PUBLIC INJECTION 41–42 (2018), https://www.mass.gov/
doc/nyc-sif-report-2018/download [https://perma.cc/5APE-KG8W]. 
 90   Jess Aloe, As Heroin Overdoses Rise, Safe Injection Site Considered in Burlington, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (July 17, 2018, 
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Denver,91 and San Francisco92 all passed local ordinances authorizing SIFs, should their state 
legislatures approve. The mayors of New York City,93 Ithaca, 94 and Somerville, Massachusetts,95 have 
voiced their interest in opening SIFs. Harm reduction advocates are also organizing in cities like 
Baltimore96 and Portland,97 where state legislative approval failed even as municipal governments may 
permit privately-run SIFs in the future. 
In virtually every case, the SIF legality origin story is about municipal governments—city 
councils open to making a SIF or at least willing to look the other way. Seattle’s plans for an SIF were 
set in motion by the King County Heroin and Prescription Opiate Addiction Task Force, comprised 
of city officials, police, emergency services, Native tribe representatives, and behavioral health 
experts.98 In September 2016, the Task Force issued policy recommendations that included piloting 
 
2:12 PM), https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/2018/07/16/burlington-city-council-join-conversation-safe-
injection-sites-overdose-heroin-fentanyl/782955002/ [https://perma.cc/KQ9H-7DSN]. A council convened by the governor 
of Vermont has since expressed serious concerns about authorizing an SIF. Mike Faher, Safe Injection Sites ‘Not a Viable Option,’ 
Governor’s Council Says, VT DIGGER (Oct. 15, 2018), https://vtdigger.org/2018/10/15/safe-injection-sites-not-a-viable-option-
governors-council-says/ [https://perma.cc/SH2B-HZED]. 
 91   Denver City Council Passes Ordinance to Create Safe Injection Site, FOX DENVER (Nov. 27, 2018, 8:34 AM), https://
kdvr.com/news/local/denver-city-council-passes-ordinance-to-create-safe-injection-site/ [https://perma.cc/FY47-EKYF]. 
 92   San Francisco Officials Approve Controversial Safe Injection Sites; Await State Approval, CBS SF BAY AREA (June 24, 2020, 
4:33 AM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/06/24/sf-supes-approve-safe-injection-sites-rehiring-city-workers-laid-off-
due-to-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/TG9X-SQWQ]. 
 93   William Neuman, De Blasio Moves to Bring Safe Injection Sites to New York City, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/nyregion/nyc-safe-injection-sites-heroin.html [https://perma.cc/Z2RU-EA7T]. 
 94   Shruti Juneja, Mayor Svante Myrick Calls Upon Cuomo for Approval of Supervised Drug Injection Sites in Ithaca, CORNELL 
DAILY SUN (May 16, 2018), https://cornellsun.com/2018/05/16/mayor-svante-myrick-calls-upon-cuomo-for-approval-of-
supervised-drug-injection-sites-in-ithaca/ [https://perma.cc/62QD-ME9N]. 
 95   Martha Bebinger & Bob Oakes, Somerville Mayor Plans to Open a Supervised Consumption Site Next Year, WBUR (Aug. 
14, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2019/08/14/curtatone-supervised-illegal-drug-use [https://perma.
cc/B5GW-S62P]. A state-level commission report proposed piloting SIFs in Massachusetts. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. 
EXEC. OFF. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE HARM REDUCTION COMMISSION 15 (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2019/03/01/Harm%20Reduction%20Commission%20Report%20%283-1-2019
%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQQ6-7TW6]. There are two pieces of SIF legislation in consideration, S.1134, 191st Gen. Ct. 
(Mass. 2019); H.1712, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2019). Governor Charlie Baker opposes SIFs. Matt Murphy, State House News 
Service, Gov. Baker Cool to Drug Injection Sites Amid U.S. Attorney’s Prosecution Threats, METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019, 
7:16 PM), https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/20190227/gov-baker-cool-to-drug-injection-sites-amid-us-attorneys-
prosecution-threats [https://perma.cc/VK8J-GNYZ]. 
 96   Brandon Soderberg, The Solution to Baltimore’s Overdose Crisis—Safe Consumption Sites, BALTIMORE BEAT (Nov. 11, 
2019), http://baltimorebeat.com/2019/11/11/the-solution-to-baltimores-overdose-crisis-safe-consumption-sites/ 
[https://perma.cc/U9DR-WCN7] (“In both 2016 and 2017, Baltimore County Delegate Dan Morhaim introduced a bill that 
would have made it legal to establish safe consumption sites in Maryland though both years, the bill died in the House.”). 
 97   In May 2017, a SIF proposal before the Maine legislature died in committee. David Harry, Portland to Consider Safe-
Injection Site for Drug Users, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.pressherald.com/2018/02/21/portland-
to-discuss-safe-injection-site-for-drug-users/ [https://perma.cc/PD95-FH28]. 
 98   KING CTY. DEP’T OF COMMUNITY & HUMAN SERVICES, HEROIN AND PRESCRIPTION OPIATE ADDICTION TASK 
FORCE: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2016), https://kingcounty.gov/~/media/depts/community-human-
services/behavioral-health-recovery/documents/herointf/Final-Heroin-Opiate-Addiction-Task-_Force-Report.ashx?la=en 
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two community health engagement location (CHEL) sites, one within Seattle and one outside city 
limits.99 Seattle City Council approved implementation and funding,100 but local opposition delayed 
CHEL plans.101 A community group opposing the CHEL pursued a ballot initiative to prohibit the 
use of public funds for a SIF that received over 69,000 voter signatures.102 The City Council 
reaffirmed its support for CHELs in November 2017, allocating $1.3 million of funding in its fiscal 
year 2018 budget.103 At the end of 2018, the ballot initiative was tossed in state court for improper 
interference with the City Council’s budget authority.104 No site yet exists, but plans are still underway 
to establish one, possibly as a mobile unit stationed near other behavioral health services.105 
In 2018, San Francisco opened a nonoperative, “pop-up” SIF to showcase the concept to 
community members and government officials.106 The showcase coincided with plans underway to 
open a SIF—the California State Legislature had passed a bill permitting a three-year pilot SIF in San 
Francisco upon local approval. 107 Then-Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill,108 stalling plans until 
the next governorship.109 The San Francisco Board of Supervisors unanimously approved an SIF 
ordinance in June 2020,110 and a bill has been refiled in the State Assembly.111 
 
[https://perma.cc/4RKM-JKDV]. 
 99   Id. at 2. 
 100   Associated Press, Seattle Budget Includes Money for Safe-Injection Site, KIRO 7 (Nov. 21, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.
usnews.com/news/best-states/washington/articles/2017-11-21/seattle-budget-includes-money-for-safe-injection-site 
[https://perma.cc/4M6G-847S]. 
 101   Timeline: The Fight for Seattle-Area Injection Sites and Cases Against Them, KIRO 7 (Oct. 16, 2017, 4:39 PM), https://
www.kiro7.com/news/local/timeline-the-fight-for-seattle-area-injection-sites-and-cases-against-them/625593672/ 
[https://perma.cc/HY5Y-WW6P]. Five other cities in King County preemptively banned SIFs. Sarah Holder, A Controversial 
Fix for Overdose Deaths: Safe Injection Sites, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Sept. 5, 2018, 1:05 PM), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-05/why-san-francisco-opened-a-mock-safe-injection-site [https://perma.cc/75NK-
K692]. 
 102   Protect Pub. Health v. Freed, 430 P.3d 640, 642 (Wash. 2018). 
 103   Associated Press, supra note 100. 
 104   Protect Pub. Health, 430 P.3d at 645. 
 105   Brandon Macz, Seattle Looking at Fixed-Mobile Safe Consumption Site Model, MADISON PARK TIMES (June 8, 2018, 9:30 
AM), https://madisonparktimes.com/MobileContent/News/Top-Stories/Article/Seattle-looking-at-fixed-mobile-safe-
consumption-site-model/26/284/31179 [https://perma.cc/MP38-R6XM]; Josh Kelety, Seattle and King County Officials Want a 
Safe Injection Van, SEATTLE WEEKLY (June 14, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.seattleweekly.com/news/seattle-and-king-county-
officials-want-a-safe-injection-van/ [https://perma.cc/KLU6-KVB3]. 
 106   Holder, supra note 101. 
 107   AB 186, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 108   Press Release, Off. of San Francisco Mayor London Breed, Mayor London Breed on the Veto of AB 186 (Sept. 
30, 2018), https://sfmayor.org/article/statement-mayor-london-breed-veto-ab-186 [https://perma.cc/85BF-K4DN]. 
 109   Governor Newsom has stated that he is “open to” SIFs. Melody Gutierrez, Bill to Create ‘Safe Injection Sites’ Won’t 
Happen This Year, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-safe-injection-sites-stalled-
20190618-story.html [https://perma.cc/MGX2-2Z8Y]. In United States v. Safehouse, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra 
joined a multistate amicus brief in support of Safehouse. See Brief of the District of Columbia and the States of California, 
Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and Virginia as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (No. 20–1422). 
 110   San Francisco Officials Approve Controversial Safe Injection Sites; Await State Approval, supra note 92. 
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Denver’s plan to open an SIF encountered difficulties similar to those that occurred in San 
Francisco. In 2017, Denver public health officials traveled to Seattle and Vancouver to study their 
opioid crisis responses.112 In 2018, Denver City Council approved an SIF with a 12-1 vote, 
authorizing a pilot program but without public funding and contingent on state statutory authority.113 
A state-level task force on substance abuse proposed SIF authorization,114 but, according to one state 
senator, as of 2019 there was not yet enough support in the state legislature.115 
The most developed SIF plan in the United States is Philadelphia’s Safehouse, a privately 
funded, nonprofit corporation116 operating without explicit authorization from Philadelphia City 
Council. Instead, Safehouse directors consulted on the project with stakeholders in city government, 
including the mayor’s office, public and behavioral health officials, and the police department.117 
While some councilmembers expressed reservations, 118 the council did not preemptively block the 
Safehouse rollout in 2018. The early formation of Safehouse thus resembles a “discretion-based” 
approach wherein SEPs operate without formal legal authorization.119 
Safehouse’s SIF has faced planning challenges similar to the King County, Washington, 
SIF120 and the Belleville SEP:121 where to put it? Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney initially voiced his 
support for Safehouse as a private entity,122 but he subsequently raised concerns about its location. In 
 
 111   AB 362, 2019-20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 112   DENVER DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T & DENVER HUM. SERV., OPIOID EPIDEMIC COLLECTIVE IMPACT 
SUMMARY REPORT 3, 8 (2018), https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/771/documents/CH/
Substance%20Misuse/Opioid%20Impact%20Summary%20Report%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W969-9CEA]. 
 113   Denver City Council Passes Ordinance to Create Safe Injection Sites, supra note 91; see generally Denver, Colo., City Council 
Bill No. 18-1292 (Nov. 7, 2018). 
 114   COLO. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREND AND RESPONSE TASK FORCE, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT app. F, at 45 
(2018), https://coag.gov/app/uploads/2020/02/TwelfthAnnualSATFR_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZTY-L3F8]. 
 115   See Jennifer Brown, Supervised Injection Site Supporters Aren’t Ready to Give Up on the Conversation in Colorado, THE COLO. 
SUN (Oct. 4. 2019, 7:05 AM), https://coloradosun.com/2019/10/04/supervised-injection-site/[https://perma.cc/WSB3-
9RLU] (“Sen. Brittany Pettersen, who planned to run the legislation last session but then didn’t introduce it because it didn’t 
have enough support, said [] she had no plans to run it next year. ‘It’s a good first step, but we have a lot of work to do to build 
enough support in Colorado and the Capitol to pass a bill[.]’”). 
 116   Who We Are, SAFEHOUSE, https://www.safehousephilly.org/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/7Q6S-FRQ9]. 
 117   Aubrey Whelan, Former Gov. Ed Rendell Is Leading Nonprofit to Open a Safe-Injection Site in Philadelphia, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/health/addiction/safe-injection-site-philadelphia-ed-rendell-
prevention-point-20181002.html [https://perma.cc/AF3J-GS6W]; Press Release, City of Phila., Mayor Kenney Issues 
Statement on Overdose Prevention Sites (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.phila.gov/2019-04-18-mayor-kenney-issues-statement-
on-overdose-prevention-sites/ [https://perma.cc/8UK8-XV94]. 
 118   Whelan, supra note 6. 
 119   See generally Vallejo, supra note 71, at 1196–97 (“Some SEPs are not authorized by statute or declaratory judgment. 
Discretion-based SEPs manage to exist either as underground SEPs or at the discretion of police enforcement and city 
officials.”). 
 120   See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text. 
 121   See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
 122   Rebecca Savransky, Top Philadelphia Officials Voice Support for Opening of Safe-Injection Sites, THE HILL (Jan. 23, 2018, 
3:56 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/370339-top-philadelphia-officials-voice-support-for-opening-
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2019, Safehouse was offered a lease in Kensington, one of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods most gravely 
affected by the opioid epidemic.123 Kenney met with Safehouse directors and urged them to look 
elsewhere, citing public safety concerns.124 One city councilmember proposed legislation to prohibit 
Safehouse from opening in Kensington,125 and most candidates for City Council when polled stated 
they were opposed to Safehouse or did not respond.126 
After a federal district court ruled that Safehouse did not violate federal drug laws,127 City 
Council took a more overtly disapproving stance. At Safehouse’s subsequent press conference, 
community members and councilmembers complained that South Philadelphia, the next proposed 
location, had been blindsided and excluded from decision-making.128 One week after Safehouse won 
the federal challenge, City Council adopted a resolution by 15-2 vote condemning the lack of 
transparency on Safehouse’s location and asking to halt its plans.129 To assess the legal viability of 
SIFs, then, is to understand their genesis and hang-ups at the municipal level. As for other forms of 
harm reduction, local approval is necessary for the successful realization of SIFs. 
 
 
of-safe [https://perma.cc/48ZE-85JY] (“We don’t want [people in addiction] dying on the street and we want to have a place 
to administer Narcan if necessary.”); The City of Philadelphia Law Department filed an amicus brief on behalf of Mayor 
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Commissioner Dr. Thomas Farley, United States v. Safehouse, No. 20-1422 (3d Cir. July 6, 2020) (West). 
 123   Aubrey Whelan, Before a Supervised Injection Site Opens in Philly, Mayor Kenney Says City Must Address Public Safety, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.philly.com/health/supervised-injection-site-philadelphia-mayor-kenney-
20190417.html [https://perma.cc/SB38-74KH]. 
 124   Id. 
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http://planphilly.com/articles/2019/03/29/councilman-mark-squilla-moves-to-block-supervised-injection-site [https://
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 126   Ernest Owens, Progressives, Your Support for Safe Injection Sites Is ‘White Lives Matter’ by Another Name, PHILA. MAG. 
(Oct. 9, 2019, 1:52 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2019/10/09/safe-injection-sites-white-progressives/ [https://
perma.cc/8NDJ-J88H]. 
 127   See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 128   Michael Tanenbaum, Safehouse’s Plan to Open Overdose Prevention Site in South Philly Sparks Contentious Reaction, 
PHILLYVOICE (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.phillyvoice.com/safehouse-south-philly-supervised-injection-site-heroin-
overdose-prevention-community-protest/ [https://perma.cc/L29G-QDFW]; Denise Nakano (@DeniseNakanoTV), 
TWITTER (Feb. 26, 2020, 2:46 PM), https://twitter.com/DeniseNakanoTV/status/1232753709790236673 
[https://perma.cc/RKZ2-EVTN]; United States v. Safehouse, No. 19-519, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110549, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 
June 24, 2020) (“Safehouse’s attempt to open without meaningful dialogue with the surrounding neighborhood was met with 
organized opposition supported by various elected officials, and the COVID-19 pandemic came to overshadow the opioid 
epidemic, understandably becoming the almost singular focus of local authorities.”). Neighborhood associations have also 
expressed their disapproval of the site in amicus briefs to court. Brief of 14 Civic Associations and the Fraternal Order of 
Police, Lodge 5, as Amici Curiae in Support of the United States’ Emergency Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal at 2, United 
States v. Safehouse, 2020 WL 3447775 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2020) (No. 19-0519), 2020 WL 1650109. 
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IV. THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEGAL HURDLES FOR SIFS 
As SEPs and nascent SIFs demonstrate, harm reduction cannot happen without advocates, 
inside or outside of government, coordinating among municipal leaders, police, and communities to 
obtain collective buy-in. Once this coordination is achieved at the local level, harm reduction policy 
can still clash with punitive approaches from state and federal governments. This was evident for 
SEPs whose sites faced legal challenges under state head shop laws. SIFs have the additional legal 
quandary of on-site drug use, triggering the attention of federal prosecutors. The federal crack house 
statute, the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA), prohibits the use of a facility for the 
consumption of controlled substances.130 Much media attention and scholarly commentary has been 
devoted to what the CSA means for SIFs. The first federal legal battleground over SIFs is United States 
v. Safehouse, in which Philadelphia’s Safehouse secured a favorable declaratory judgment that is now on 
appeal. The following Sections reviews the legal hurdles SIFs face and legal arguments to overcome 
those hurdles. 
A. The state hurdle: disapproving governors and legislatures 
Even with local entities on board, a locality must then consider potential state challenges to 
its proposed SIF. Most cities with SIF interest have stalled plans until they receive explicit sanction 
from the state legislature and governor. In New York, Governor Andrew Cuomo quite transparently 
held off on considering approval of New York City’s proposed SIFs until after his 2018 re-election,131 
and he is still concerned about the continued threat of federal lawsuits.132 New York City Mayor Bill 
de Blasio, whose office “punt[ed] on the issue” for several months, maintains that the city needs 
authorization from the state Health Department before setting up sites.133 Ithaca’s mayor also awaits 
Governor Cuomo’s green light.134 San Francisco is in a similar position with respect to approval from 
the State of California.135 
The easiest path forward for a locality is state-level exemption from criminal liability.136 But 
 
 130   21 U.S.C §§ 801-971; see also infra Part IV.B.1. 
 131  Amanda Eisenberg, New York Inches Closer to Supervised Injection Sites Despite Threat from Trump Administration, 
POLITICO (Dec. 15, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/12/05/new-york-inches-
closer-to-supervised-injection-sites-despite-threat-from-trump-administration-726216 [https://perma.cc/ED5Z-4GRM]. 
 132   Jake Offenhartz, ‘Your Governor is Afraid’: As Federal Judge OKs Safe Injection Sites, Advocates Await Cuomo’s Support, 
GOTHAMIST (Oct. 4, 2019, 12:43 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/your-governor-afraid-federal-judge-oks-safe-injection-
sites-advocates-await-cuomos-support [https://perma.cc/MNV7-W76H]; see also Caroline Lewis, NYC Plan for Safe Injection Sites 
Faces Resistance from Cuomo, Trump, GOTHAMIST (Feb. 7, 2019, 2:25 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-plan-for-safe-
injection-sites-faces-resistance-from-cuomo-trump [https://perma.cc/7THC-9P2E] (noting that State Health Commissioner 
Howard Zucker said that approval of an SIF in New York was delayed in part because he was skeptical it would promote 
public health). 
 133   Eisenberg, supra note 131. 
 134   See Juneja, supra note 94. 
 135   See San Francisco Officials Approve Controversial Safe Injection Sites; Await State Approval, supra note 92. 
 136   Cylas Martell-Crawford, Safe Injection Facilities: A Path to Legitimacy, 11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 124, 128 (2017). 
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could New York City or San Francisco pursue a SIF without explicit state-level137 permission? A 
brazen-enough locality could attempt the position that “it is better to ask forgiveness than 
permission” from its state government.138 Declaring a public health emergency within the locality 
could help legitimize the effort.139 In Philadelphia’s case, Safehouse directors opted for private 
funding and declined to seek an explicit authorizing statute, given that Pennsylvania Governor Tom 
Wolf vocally opposes the use of public funds for a SIF.140 To date, no state has passed a law 
affirmatively allowing a SIF. 
If a locality prefers to rely on affirmative legal authority over prosecutorial discretion by the 
state, it has several legal defenses available in the realm of state delegation of power to localities. 
Localities can look to state constitutional arguments for the legal authority to conduct their own 
public health initiatives in the face of crisis. About one-third of state constitutions reference public 
health.141 In California, municipalities have broad discretionary power to “make and enforce within its 
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general 
laws.”142 In fact, California localities need not limit their ordinances to local affairs. A locality’s 
ordinance is restricted only by the laws and constitutions of the state and federal governments. While 
California has a state crack house statute imposing criminal liability for a property owner where the 
place is maintained “for the purpose of” drug use,143 San Francisco could, if faced with prosecution 
by the state, argue that state law does not preempt its ordinance and that the statute does not apply. 
To establish its local authority to pass an ordinance authorizing an SIF, San Francisco would argue 
that the ordinance occupies a different field and has a different purpose from the state crack house 
statute.144 
In states with home rule statutes, localities enjoy a favorable bent when municipal 
ordinances face possible preemption by state law. In Pennsylvania, the First Class City Home Rule 
 
 137   A state government may authorize a SIF by statute, executive order, or administrative rulemaking, depending on 
allocation of powers. Leo Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Facilities in the United States, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
231, 233 (2009). 
 138   State ex rel. Atl. Cty. Prosecutor v. City of Atl. City, 879 A.2d 1206, 1207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(describing history of Atlantic City authorizing a city SEP without express permission from the state). 
 139   See Martell-Crawford, supra note 136, at 129 (“Health emergencies have been declared to justify the use of needle 
exchange programs for many of the same reasons used to justify SIFs, such as the prevention of HIV/AIDS and to work to 
curb the . . . heroin epidemic.”). In 2017, President Trump declared the opioid crisis a public health emergency, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, ENDING AMERICA’S OPIOID CRISIS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/opioids/ [https://perma.cc/JM4B-Z4SV] (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2020), but this was likely without any intention to change the legal authority of municipalities. 
 140   Bobby Allyn, As Philly Moves Closer to Supervised Injection Site, Gov. Wolf Remains Opposed, WHYY (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://whyy.org/articles/as-philly-moves-closer-to-supervised-injection-site-gov-wolf-remains-opposed/ [https://perma.cc/
7K34-KTCD]. 
 141   Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1328 
(2010). 
 142   CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 143   CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11366 (West 1991). 
 144   Cf. Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Board, 35 Cal.3d 858, 868–69 (Cal. 1984) (holding that a Santa 
Monica rent control law is within its police power because it is distinct from and would not “materially interfere” with the 
purposes of a state legislation). 
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Act grants cities authority of local self-government, including “complete powers of legislation and 
administration in relation to [their] municipal functions.”145 The Act’s enabling legislation provides 
that “[a]ll grants of municipal power to municipalities governed by a home rule charter under this 
subchapter, whether in the form of specific enumeration or general terms, shall be liberally construed 
in favor of the municipality.”146 A Pennsylvania city seeking to host a safe injection site, opposite a 
disapproving state legislature and governor, can argue that authorization for the site is within the 
municipality’s local power. Preventing opioid overdose death within a locality, the argument goes, is a 
municipal function. After all, it is the city’s own police forces, public health department, parks 
department, libraries, street cleaners, and residents who must deal with overdoses and overdose 
deaths. In Philadelphia, the city has already authorized a clean needle exchange and equipped first 
responders with naloxone.147 If the city can provide clean needles and administer naloxone under a 
home rule structure of legal authority, surely it can use that authority to sanction a space to administer 
naloxone when it is most critically needed. 
States enjoy broad authority to criminalize drug-related activity and preempt local law. The 
timidity of cities like New York City and San Francisco is understandable. Their legal counsel likely 
warned of state preemption and costly litigation defending a proposed safe injection site absent the 
governor’s blessing. But local authority to self-govern and to enact public health initiatives permits 
cities to proceed without necessarily getting overt state-level authorization. Where a locality disagrees 
with the state on the legality of an SIF, it should look to state constitutions and home rule statutes as 
sources of local legal authority. 
B. The federal hurdle: The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) 
1. Perspectives on CSA § 856(a) liability 
Under what is colloquially known as the crack house statute, the Controlled Substances Act 
of 1970 (CSA)148 imposes liability for property owners and lessees of facilities whose purpose is to 
allow consumption of controlled substances.149 Heroin is a Schedule I substance, and fentanyl is a 
Schedule II substance.150 Federal interference with cities’ plans to open injection sites began in 
August 2018, with Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein’s New York Times op-ed stating that such 
sites are illegal under federal law.151 U.S. Attorneys across the country have echoed a commitment to 
 
 145   53 Pa. Stat and Cons Stat. § 13131 (West 2004). 
 146   53 Pa. Stat and Cons Stat. § 2961 (West 1996). 
 147   See Prevention Point, Syringe Service Program, https://ppponline.org/syringe-service-program 
[https://perma.cc/8MBS-V2JC] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020) (describing syringe exchange services at Philadelphia’s Prevention 
Point); City of Philadelphia, Combating the opioid epidemic: The City’s response, https://www.phila.gov/
programs/combating-the-opioid-epidemic/the-citys-response [https://perma.cc/2NZH-HWSC] (describing Philadelphia’s 
distribution of naloxone to first responders). 
 148   21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 and its implementing regulations, 21 C.F.R. §§ 1300.01–1321.01. 
 149   21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). 
 150   21 U.S.C. § 812(c). 
 151   Rod J. Rosenstein, Opinion, Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/08/27/opinion/opioids-heroin-injection-sites.html [https://perma.cc/2AZC-MYNS]. 
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prosecute sites, reiterating this position whenever a locality has brought a site proposal.152 While sites 
maintain a bring-your-own-drugs policy and would not violate laws relating to drug possession, 
distribution, or trafficking, they do appear to, at least according to federal prosecutors, violate the 
crack house provision: 
[I]t shall be unlawful to . . . manage or control any place, whether permanently or 
temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, 
and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, 
with or without compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully 
manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.153 
Scholars and commentators have examined what the CSA may mean for SIFs. Some see 
federal criminality as a given, with the only paths forward being prosecutorial discretion or a change 
in the law.154 Others identified legal arguments an SIF could make to protect it from liability. Scott 
Burris and his colleagues have reviewed local and state authority to open an SIF as well as statutory 
interpretation and constitutional arguments to fend off federal charges.155 Alex Kreit has also 
analyzed at length the legality of SIFs in the face of the CSA.156 They both argue that, beyond hoping 
for the federal government to exercise restraint, SIFs have salient legal defenses. 
 
 152   E.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Massachusetts, Statement from U.S. Attorney Lelling 
Regarding Drug Injection Sites (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/statement-us-attorney-lelling-regarding-
drug-injection-sites [https://perma.cc/B3AM-8BR4] (stating that “efforts to open injection facilities . . . will be met with 
federal enforcement”); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Colorado, Joint Statement of the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office and the Denver Field Office of the Drug Enforcement Administration Regarding the City and County of Denver’s 
Proposal to Create Supervised Locations to Inject Heroin and Other Illegal Drugs (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
usao-co/pr/joint-statement-us-attorney-s-office-and-denver-field-office-drug-enforcement [https://perma.cc/65XP-275J] 
(stating that operating such sites violates federal law); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Vermont, Statement of 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office Concerning Proposed Injection Sites, https://www.justice.gov/usao-vt/pr/statement-us-attorney-s-
office-concerning-proposed-injection-sites [https://perma.cc/NU85-474F] (stating that sites would “encourage and normalize 
heroin use” and violate federal law); Shannon Lin, US Attorney Threatens Legal Action if San Francisco Opens Supervised Injection Sites, 
KQED (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.kqed.org/news/11804290/us-attorney-threatens-legal-action-if-san-francisco-opens-
supervised-injection-sites [https://perma.cc/AY6C-9KYR] (stating that the U.S. Attorney’s Office will respond to a San 
Francisco proposal to open supervised drug injection sites by enforcing federal law); Mike Carter, Seattle’s New U.S. Attorney 
Says He Won’t Allow City to Open Safe-Injection Site, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019, 5:49 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/seattles-new-u-s-attorney-says-he-wont-allow-city-to-open-safe-injection-site/ [https://perma.cc/G7SZ-RR8N] 
(reporting that U.S. Attorney Brian Morton will “not allow a safe injection site for illicit drugs to open in [Seattle]”). 
 153   21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). 
 154   E.g., Editorial, Let Cities Open Safe Injection Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/
24/opinion/sunday/drugs-safe-injection-sites.html [https://perma.cc/2TNK-7Q5Q]; Martell-Crawford, supra note 136, at 135 
(“[C]ase law suggests that a federal challenge to state laws in the realm of health and the Controlled Substance Act tips in favor 
of the federal government, vitiating state law.”) (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)); Anna M. Bonventre, Comment, 
Injecting the Solution or Encouraging the Epidemic: The Legality of Safe Injection Sites and the Healthcare Professionals Duty of Non-Maleficence, 
12 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 9 (2018) (“[T]hese sites would not be legal under federal drug laws.”). 
 155   Burris et al., Federalism, supra note 44, at 1089. 
 156   Kreit, supra note 85, at 413. 
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First, SIFs could advocate for a narrow reading of the CSA that requires the property owner 
to have specific intent to store, distribute, manufacture, or use drugs.157 The Eighth Circuit 
considered and rejected such an argument in United States v. Tebeau.158 There, the defendant, who 
owned land used for music festivals, was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) after an investigation 
uncovered drug use and drug sales at the festivals.159 He argued that his mere knowledge of drug use 
and drug sales was not sufficient to violate § 856(a)(2) absent the specific intent to engage in the 
forbidden drug-related conduct.160 But the Eighth Circuit held that specific intent was not required 
and the statute required only the purpose of maintaining property, not the purpose of drug activity.161 
Several circuit courts had previously arrived at a similar interpretation by construing the statute 
narrowly.162 They reasoned that to read § 856(a)(2) to require specific intent of drug activity would 
make redundant § 856(a)(1), violating a “cardinal principle of statutory construction . . . .”163 The 
Supreme Court has not taken up this statutory interpretation issue.164 
The second proposed legal defense is that bona fide, locally authorized health facilities are 
excluded from the scope of the CSA.165 This is functionally a federalism defense following precedent 
relating to physician-assisted suicide. Scholars have suggested that the 2006 Supreme Court case 
Gonzales v. Oregon166 could provide SIFs with legal protection.167 In Gonzales, the Court stated that the 
CSA “manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally.”168 On one hand, some 
scholars maintain that Gonzales favors the legality of SIFs because they are public health initiatives 
managed and staffed by medical professionals.169 Kreit, however, has warned that the precedential 
power of Gonzales is limited in a SIF case because Gonzales involved a rule authorizing the Attorney 
General to determine what uses of a medicine are legitimate, whereas a SIF case does not require an 
executive to assess the medical value of a site.170 
 
 157   See id. at 431–34. 
 158   713 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 159   Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 958. 
 160   Id. at 958–59. 
 161   Id. at 960. 
 162   United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Bilis, 170 F.3d 88, 92–93 (1st Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Banks, 987 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 163   Tebeau, 713 F.2d at 960 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)). 
 164   Certiorari was denied in Tebeau v. United States, 571 U.S. 888 (2013). 
 165   Burris et al., Federalism, supra note 44, at 1121–34. 
 166   546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 167   E.g., Burris et al., Federalism, supra note 44, at 1134–39. 
 168   Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270. 
 169   See, e.g., Burris et al., Federalism, supra note 44, at 1138–39; see also Beletsky et al., supra note 137, at 234 (arguing that 
CSA’s legislative history shows that Congress’s intent was not to regulate a “legally authorized public health intervention” – 
traditionally within the realm of state police powers – but rather crack houses “during the height of the crack epidemic” and 
“‘rave’ parties”). 
 170   Kreit, supra note 85, at 436–37. 
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Kreit also brought attention to a third idea: the CSA’s own immunity provision.171 The 
provision states that: 
no civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by virtue of this subchapter upon . . . 
any duly authorized officer of any State, territory, political subdivision thereof, the 
District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States, who shall be lawfully 
engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to 
controlled substances.172 
According to Kreit, the immunity provision was designed to protect police officers from 
prosecution related to the drug crimes they would necessarily commit during undercover operations, 
but he posited that the provision could also be invoked for a state- or municipality-sanctioned SIF.173 
The provision allows immunity for: (1) an officer of any state, territory, political subdivision thereof, 
(2) with due authority, (3) lawfully engaging in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance 
relating to the controlled substance.174 Should a city council pass an ordinance authorizing an SIF, 
Kreit proposed that the municipality and staff running the site be officers with due authority, pointing 
to state medical marijuana laws as precedent.175 Courts repeatedly have held that police officers are 
immune from federal drug laws when ordered under state law to return marijuana to a patient.176 
Burris and his colleagues have raised an additional Commerce Clause argument, stating that 
“[o]ccasionally, and unpredictably, the Supreme Court decides that Congress has gone too far by 
seeking to regulate a matter with too tenuous a connection to commerce.”177 They conceded that this 
argument was “speculation on stilts”178 given unfavorable precedent in Gonzales v. Raich, where the 
Supreme Court held that CSA application to individuals who cultivated or obtained free medical 
marijuana was within the scope of the Commerce Clause.179 Likewise, Kreit has called Raich “the 




 171   Id. at 442–62. 
 172   21 U.S.C. § 885(d). 
 173   Kreit, supra note 85, at 443. 
 174   21 U.S.C. § 885(d). 
 175   Kreit, supra note 85, at 445-46. 
 176   See id. at 446-49 (discussing state court decisions immunizing police officers in medical marijuana-related cases). 
 177   Beletsky et al., supra note 137, at 234. 
 178   Burris et al., Federalism, supra note 44, at 1144. 
 179   Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 180   Burris et al., Federalism, supra note 44, at 1144 n.240 (citing Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 
705, 706 (2006)). 
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2. United States v. Safehouse: the § 856(a) battleground for SIFs 
On February 5, 2019, the Department of Justice made good on its warning to block SIFs181 
when William McSwain, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, filed a civil 
complaint against Safehouse.182 Forgoing criminal charges with possible prison time, a fine of up to 
$250,000, and forfeiture of property, the federal government chose to act preemptively with an 
austere request for declaratory judgment.183 The complaint alleges that Safehouse “will knowingly and 
intentionally provide a place for drug users to use controlled substances unlawfully . . . .”184 
Safehouse filed an answer, counterclaim, and third-party complaint on April 3, 2019.185 The 
answer contains many of the statutory interpretation arguments posited by legal scholars who 
considered this issue. First, Safehouse cited Gonzales as a limitation of CSA on “regulat[ing] the 
practice of medicine.”186 Second, Safehouse argued for a narrow reading of § 856(a) to apply to drug 
dealers and “crack houses,” not public health measures: “the purpose of” language in the statute 
makes it inapplicable to their site, stating that its only purpose is to save lives by “enabling access to a 
critical medical intervention.”187 Third, Safehouse also invoked a Commerce Clause argument.188 
Safehouse did not argue that it was immune from the CSA because, as Kreit observed, the 
immunity provision applies only to “duly authorized officer[s]” of a state or locality, so a privately-run 
SIF would not invoke the defense.189 Safehouse could have tried to argue that it was duly authorized 
by the City of Philadelphia. However, while Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney has acknowledged the 
public benefits of a SIF, and Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner has announced he does not 
intend to press charges in relation to the facility, Philadelphia City Council has not officially 
prohibited Safehouse from operating, and there is opposition to the use of public funds for this 
purpose.190 To invoke the immunity defense, Safehouse would also need a law or municipal ordinance 
 
 181   See supra notes 150-51. 
 182   Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2019) 
(No. 19-0519), 2019 WL 462760. 
 183   The CSA imposes severe criminal penalties. 21 U.S.C. § 856(d); see also Rosenstein, supra note 151 (“It is a federal 
felony to maintain any location for the purpose of facilitating illicit drug use. Violations are punishable by up to 20 years in 
prison, hefty fines and forfeiture of the property used in the criminal activity.”). 
 184   Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 6, United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 
May 28, 2019) (No. 19-0519), 2019 WL 6704498. 
 185   Defendant Safehouse’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaims to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and Third-Party 
Complaint, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2019) (No. 19-0519), 2019 WL 8723727 [hereinafter Answer]. 
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 187   Id. at 29, 32–33. 
 188   Id. at 35–38. 
 189   See Kreit, supra note 85, at 462 (suggesting Philadelphia may trigger CSA immunity by “passing an ordinance to 
closely regulate safe injection sites and designating all Safehouse employees as ‘duly authorized officer[s]’ of the city.”). 
 190   Elana Gordon, What’s Next for ‘Safe Injection’ Sites in Philadelphia?, NPR (Jan. 24, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://www.
npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/01/24/580255140/whats-next-for-safe-injection-sites-in-philadelphia [https://perma.
cc/FQU9-CKSJ]; Pat Loeb & Tim Jimenez, Safehouse Voluntarily Delays Opening of South Philadelphia Safe Injection Site, KYW 
NEWSRADIO (Feb. 28, 2020, 11:45 AM), https://www.radio.com/kywnewsradio/articles/news/safehouse-delays-opening-of-
safe-injection-site [https://perma.cc/D3RR-T2K6]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol24/iss1/3
 THE LOCALITY’S CASE FOR SAFE INJECTION FACILITIES  
61 
 
to enforce. A Philadelphia city ordinance authorizing Safehouse would have been the most 
straightforward vehicle, but without it, Safehouse could still look to the myriad laws and ordinances 
regarding clean needle exchanges, naloxone distribution, counseling and social services, and other 
legislation related to its mission. 
Safehouse’s answer was a vivid appeal to logic. Safehouse pointed to state and federal laws 
endorsing and funding syringe exchange programs and naloxone.191 The government supports the 
furnishing of clean needles for drug consumption, and of overdose medication such as naloxone, but 
“under the DOJ’s rationale, a syringe exchange program is transformed from a legal, federally 
endorsed public health measure into a 20-year felony simply by allowing participants to remain . . . 
under the supervision of its medical practitioners at the critical moment of consumption when death 
is most likely to occur.”192 Implicit in this line of argument is the suggestion that policy should make 
sense—that steadfast enforcement of criminal law against an SIF is not compatible with the 
commonsense policy that when drug users have access to clean needles, and to people who can 
administer naloxone, they should not be forced to leave the building and go to an unsupervised park 
to use their drugs. 
Safehouse’s most innovative argument, the only one not foreseen in the scholarly literature, 
invoked protection under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Safehouse brought a 
counterclaim that RFRA bars the application of § 856(a) to their organization, where the founders 
and directors are exercising their religious beliefs to save lives.193 Under RFRA, 
[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability [unless the government can] 
demonstrate[] that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.194 
In the Safehouse case, the defendants stated they were exercising their Judeo-Christian 
religious beliefs by protecting life, providing shelter, and caring for the ill.195 The government then 
faced the burden of proving that the enforcement of § 856(a) to close Safehouse is the least restrictive 
means of fostering its compelling interest.196 
Safehouse is not a religiously affiliated organization, and its proposed site will not hold 
religious services. But RFRA applies to any federal action that substantially burdens a person’s 
exercise of religion, and, under Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, running a corporation “in a manner consistent 
with” religious beliefs is an exercise of religion.197 
 
 
 191   Answer, supra note 185, at 24–28. 
 192   Id. at 24. 
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RFRA analysis compels a discussion of the policy issues at stake. Rather than arguing about 
whether § 856(a) can be enforced against Safehouse, under RFRA the government had to explain why 
§ 856(a) must be enforced against them. Is the government’s compelling interest to prevent drug 
consumption? To save lives? Safehouse can then provide evidence on how its site would advance, not 
hinder, those interests. Defendants pitched United States v. Safehouse as an ideological re-match of 
RFRA protections after Hobby Lobby, whose holding has been admonished as discriminatory.198 
The government did not take the RFRA bait to discuss its compelling interest in shutting 
down SIFs. Instead, in its motion for judgment on the pleadings, the government contended that 
Safehouse was not protected by RFRA.199 They argued that defendants’ beliefs were not substantially 
burdened because the defendants were not being coerced to do anything—the government merely 
asked that they keep to the status quo.200 Moreover, the government argued, Safehouse had alternative 
means available, and their proposed conduct was not so much religious as socio-political or 
philosophical.201 On the RFRA issue, the court also expressed its disfavor for “transform[ing] an issue 
of statutory construction into a public policy debate.”202 
In February 2020, the district court granted Safehouse’s motion for declaratory judgment.203 
The court found for Safehouse on § 856(a)(2) interpretation,204 in part because Congress did not 
intend or mean for § 856(a)(2) to apply to SIFs as they had not yet entered public discourse.205 For 
now, the application of RFRA and the Commerce Clause to SIFs has been tabled,206 but as of this 
Article’s publication, the final outcome remains to be seen. In June 2020, the court granted the 
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February 2020 headlines read: “Judge clears path for Philadelphia nonprofit to open safe-
injection site to combat overdoses;”208 “Philly’s Safehouse to open nation’s first supervised injection 
site after judge clearance;”209 “Federal Judge Clears Way For Nation’s First Supervised Injection Site 
To Open In Philadelphia.”210 But experience demonstrates that an SIF’s legal viability cannot be 
guaranteed by a federal judge. Decisionmakers and stakeholders at each level of government must 
also clear the way. A locality seeking to open an SIF will undoubtedly face a complex series of 
hurdles, from local ordinances and zoning to state preemption. Even with Safehouse’s latest victory 
in federal court, its legal status remains precarious as Philadelphia City Council voices its disapproval. 
When the U.S. gets its first SIF, it will not be because of a federal case, or because of a change in 
presidential administration. It will be because of the careful alignment of harm reduction advocacy, 
local law, police noninterference, state sanction or discretion, and federal sanction or discretion. 
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